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Acting out of a world still organized around the
tenets of mercantilism, colonial Americans invented
another approach to value.
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Listening  to  the  history  of  value
In  1601,  strapped  for  funds  and  pressed  for  time,  Elizabeth  I
ordered  her  mints  to  create  new  Irish  coins  that  were  short  on
silver.  She  used  the  base  money,  adorned  with  the  same  harp
that  the  Tudors  had  traditionally  chosen  for  their  Irish  coinage,
to  pay  her  royal  army  to  put  down  the  Ulster  confederacy.  Her
strategy  captured  as  profit  the  difference  between  the  face  value
of  the  new  money  and  its  lower  metallic  value.  At  the  same
time,  Elizabeth  outlawed  use  of  the  old  coins  with  higher  silver
content;;  these  became  bullion,  available  to  be  minted  into  the
new  currency.  In  a  stroke,  Elizabeth  had  raised  a  revenue
without  recourse  to  Parliament,  its  delays,  and  its  demands.  A
few  years  later,  a  common  law  court  confirmed  the  Queen’s
sovereign  authority  to  declare  the  denomination,  weight,  and
worth  of  money.  The  new  coins  circulated,  silver  "harps"  of  a
literally  lighter  note.









before,  Parliament  had  prohibited  American  legislatures  from
issuing  colonial  paper  notes  for  legal  tender,  triggering  a
currency  scarcity  that  bore  down  on  the  small  rural  producers
and  consumers  of  the  state.  Their  solution  was  as  bold  as
Elizabeth’s:  let  the  general  assembly  issue  paper  without  any
official  status;;  the  people  of  Pennsylvania  by  mutual  pledge
would  "receive  the  bills  .  .  .  in  discharge  of  all  debts  and
contracts,  and  in  the  business  of  trade  and  commerce  to  all
intents  and  purposes  as  if  they  were  made  and  declared  by  law
to  be  legal  tender  in  all  cases  whatever."  In  other  words,  the
people  would  cooperate  in  treating  a  homemade  money  with  no
legal  backing  as  if  it  were  the  officially  sanctioned  medium.  If
they  had  been  able  to  pull  it  off—had  they  convinced  the
legislature  and  maintained  their  pledge—the  money  would  have
succeeded,  its  value  founded  on  their  collective  commitment
rather  than  the  sovereign’s  authority.  The  money,  we  might
imagine,  would  have  looked  much  like  the  bills  of  credit
Nova  Constellatio  coin.  Courtesy  the  Libraries  of  the  University
of  Notre  Dame.  More  information  on  their  Website.
produced  during  the  period  before  the  Act  of  1764:  rough
prints  of  surprising  beauty,  often  bearing  a  provincial  symbol—
the  pine  tree  or  the  fox,  a  snake,  sailing  ship,  or  colony  seal,
edged  with  garlands  or  a  scrolled  pattern.
A  revolution  later,  Robert
Morris  argued  that  the
emerging  states  required  a  very
new  sort  of  money.  According
to  his  Report  on  the  Public
Credit,  sent  to  Congress  on
July  29,  1782,  the  war  had
demonstrated  that  Americans
must  anchor  their  system  on
silver  and  gold  specie  with  a
value  set  by  international
exchange.  Specie  would  be
multiplied  by  credit—notes
borrowed  by  governments  or
private  individuals—that  would
lubricate  the  productive
activities  of  enterprising  men.
The  public  role  here  was
neither  to  decree  value  nor  to
coordinate  its  creation.  Rather,
Congress  would  set  up  a
structure  within  which
individuals  would  act
according  to  their  own  ends,
unlocking  the  "secret  hoards"  of  precious  metal  they  had  long
since  hidden,  lending,  borrowing,  investing  in  an  economic
whirl  that  would  energize  the  new  nation.  Morris  proposed  a
new  unit  for  the  federal  coinage:  the  "mill,"  which  would  be
defined  according  to  a  standard  metallic  content  of  one  quarter
grain  of  silver  and  would,  by  factoring  easily  into  the
heterogeneous  state  and  foreign  currencies  then  circulating,  ease
conversion  to  the  new  national  money.  Morris  even  had
prototypes  of  his  proposed  money  minted:  the  legend  Nova
Constellatio  encircled  a  sunburst  of  rays  that  emanated  from  an
Eye  of  Providence;;  thirteen  stars  surrounded  the  sunburst  and
the  back  of  the  coin  bore  the  words  Libertas-­Justitia.  At  the
same  time,  Morris  worked  to  convert  the  Continental  dollars
owed  American  troops  into  interest-­bearing  IOUs.
The  harps  of  Elizabeth,  the  paper  money  imagined  by  the
people  of  Chester,  and  the  specie-­and-­debt  combination
proposed  by  Morris  are  more  than  historical  tokens,  intriguing
material  artifacts  of  their  times.  They  are  also  more  than
ornaments  on  the  political  dramas  that  produced  them:  the
tragic  policy  of  Elizabeth  towards  the  Irish,  the  ineptitude  of
Parliament  confronting  a  rising  American  population,  or  the
The  Irish  harp.  Courtesy  of  John  Stafford-­Langan.  More
early  nationalist  impulses  of  American  economic  elites.  Rather,
currencies  are  the  language  of  value,  and  like  other  languages,
they  convey  a  history,  if  we  can  hear  it.  Embedded  in  the
currencies  of  Elizabeth,  Chester,  and  Morris  are  three  distinct
theories  of  value—or,  more  precisely,  three  constitutions  or
regimes  of  practice  that  produced  value.  These  distinct
approaches  to  the  creation  of  value  illuminate  the  political
economies  of  their  times.  In  so  doing,  they  allow  us  to
reconsider  mercantilism,  to  define  capitalism  in  new  ways,  and
to  recognize  alternative  forms  of  value  creation  that  we’ve
previously  neglected.  More  generally,  they  suggest  the  need  for
a  history  of  the  way  we  produce  value,  as  well  as  meaning,  and
the  way  we  distribute  value,  as  well  as  meaning,  in  selective
ways.
The  Queen  and  the  Irish  Harp
When  Elizabeth  debased  the  Irish  harp,  she  acted  against  a
well-­recognized  baseline.  Value,  at  the  turn  of  the  sixteenth
century,  was  widely  understood  in  a  particular  way:  it  was  a
real  or  tangible  resource  to  be  collected,  controlled,  and
distributed  by  a  sovereign.  The  character  of  money  lay  at  the
heart  of  that  practice,  with  all  its  political  and  legal  complexity,
its  material  impact,  and  the  conceptual  categories  that  attended
those  dimensions.  Through  its  medium,  a  particular  approach  to
value  penetrated  the  constitutional  relations  of  mercantilism,
the  precapitalist  belief  that  value  was  acquired  not  made.
Listen  to  the  reasoning  of  the
court  that  legitimated
Elizabeth’s  act.  The  political
message  is  perhaps  the  most
conspicuous.  According  to  the
judges,  the  King’s  power  to
make  money  was  enormous;;  he
alone  could  make  money  "of
what  matter  and  form  he
pleaseth,"  determining  its
weight,  denomination,
fineness,  and  stature  as  legal
tender.  Generally,  monarchs
used  metallic  tokens,  convinced
that  value  depended  on  the
amount  of  precious  metal
captured  in  the  coin.  Likewise,
the  more  gold  or  silver  a
country  monopolized,  the
wealthier  would  be  that  polity.
Sovereign  power  and  control
information  on  the  Irish  Coinage  Website. over  value  were  joined  at  the
root.
Even  more  striking,  the  King  alone  could  "by  his  prerogative  .
.  .  put  a  price  of  valuation  on  all  coins"—and  he  could  change
that  valuation  at  will.  The  King  could,  in  other  words,
drastically  affect  the  fortunes  of  men:  "so  may  he  change  his
money  in  substance  and  impression,  and  enhance  or  debase  the
value  of  it,  or  entirely  decry  and  annul  it,  so  that  it  shall  be  but
bullion  at  his  pleasure."  Moreover,  the  monarch  acted  without
recourse  to  Parliament;;  in  such  a  regime,  the  King  could  raise
revenue  and  save  a  kingdom,  all  without  asking  Parliament  to
levy  a  tax.
But  an  approach  to  value  that  placed  it  largely  in  the  hands  of  a
sovereign  was  not  a  regime  without  law.  To  the  contrary,  the
judges  located  the  rationale  for  "a  standard  of  money"  in  a
notable  place:  the  need  for  individuals  to  contract  with  each
other.  "For  no  Commonwealth  can  subsist  without  contracts,"
they  observed,  "and  no  contracts  without  equality  [of  terms],
and  no  equality  in  contracts  without  money."  The  need  for  a
token  that  held  a  value  constant  between  holders,  if  not  a  value
consistent  over  time  (given  debasements),  in  turn  supported  the
monarch’s  prerogative  to  determine  value.  And  if  debasement
for  good  cause  was  legal—and  the  judges  clearly  determined  it
to  be  within  the  common  law—then  the  redistribution  of
property  that  it  entailed  was  legal  as  well.  This  regime  thus
embedded  in  legal  relations  an  order  that  expressly
encompassed  sovereignty  over  private  resources,  with
organizing  effects  on  the  social,  political,  and  material
hierarchies  that  resulted.
The  dynamics  of  the  system  stretched  from  exceptional  cases
like  the  Irish  harp  to  everyday  practice.  Economists  have
argued  that  regimes  relying  on  coins  supposed  to  be  worth  the
intrinsic  value  of  their  metallic  content  could  not  regulate
amounts  of  small  change  in  circulation;;  early  modern  rulers
regularly  debased  currency  in  order  to  cure  shortages  of  coin—
not  always  because  of  their  designs  on  revenue.  That  is,  an
approach  to  value  that  identified  it  as  inhering  in  real  resources
brought  with  it  the  practical  consequence  of  devaluation,  a
dynamic  that  then  had  to  be  managed,  politically  and  legally.
That  project  would  affect  basic  categories  like  rights  and
property  as  participants  rationalized  the  political  economy  they
created.  For  example,  early  English  judges  created  mechanisms,
like  the  petition  of  right,  that  bound  the  Crown  to  repay  public
creditors  while  preserving  its  ultimate  discretion  over  the  value
of  that  payment.  The  courts  granted  no  such  latitude  to
participants  in  private  contracts.  The  division  distinguished  the
standards  that  bound  public  and  private  entities,  an  orientation
that  affected  how  rights  against  the  state  were  defined,  where
"rights"  themselves  were  located  (in  the  community  or  the
individual),  and  when  individual  interests  should  give  way  to
the  claims  of  the  public.
In  the  end,  the  Elizabethan  categories  used  to  understand
governance,  the  definitions  given  property  and  rights,  and  the
power  granted  the  sovereign  all  related  intimately  to  an
approach  to  value  that  treated  it  as  a  tangible  resource  to  be
garnered  and  dispensed  across  a  kingdom  coordinated  at  the
center.
Paper  Models  of  Value
Acting  out  of  a  world  still  organized  around  the  tenets  of
mercantilism,  colonial  Americans  invented  another  approach  to
value.  The  paper  money  proposed  in  Chester  followed  seventy
years  of  experimentation  and  turned  on  the  insight  it  had
produced:  value  was  a  functional  concept  that  could  be  created
by  collective  action.  Since  the  early  eighteenth  century,
Americans  had  circulated  public  "bills  of  credit"  (essentially
IOUs)  as  money  when,  like  the  inhabitants  of  Chester,  they
lacked  silver  and  gold.  Local  communities  issued  non-­interest-­
bearing  notes  (notes  stating  a  government  obligation)  to  pay
their  creditors.  Those  IOUs  could  be  submitted  or  "retired"  to
pay  for  tax  obligations;;  in  the  interim,  they  functioned  as  silver
or  gold  currency  because  they  would  be  as  good  as  silver  or
gold  for  future  public  payments.  As  modern  macroeconomists
have  shown,  the  notes  carried  real  value  because  the  collective
practice  of  issue  and  retirement  created  a  value-­bearing  asset
out  of  them,  at  least  as  long  as  people  could  predict  that  they
would  be  taxed.
The  new  approach  to  value  radically  redistributed  political
authority.  Provincial  assemblies,  formally  prohibited  from
controlling  expenditures,  took  charge  of  public  spending  when
they  invented  a  money  under  their  own  auspices.  They  now
paid  public  creditors,  directed  appropriations,  and  made  land-­
based  loans.  The  issue  of  paper  money  thus  fueled  the  famed
"rise"  of  the  American  assembly  in  each  colony:  legislators
exercised  increasing  authority  in  practice  and  began  to  assert
rights  against  the  imperial  order  more  aggressively.
Even  more  startling  was  the  power  now  claimed  by  taxpayers:
monetary  policy  depended  on  their  votes,  and  the  stability  of
economic  value  depended  on  their  compliance  with  levies.
When  they  cooperated,  taxpayers  financed  the  expenses  of  the
public  by  meeting  those  obligations.  But  when  inhabitants  were
strapped  by  war  or  economic  distress,  tax  defaults  rose  and
money  depreciated.  In  those  circumstances,  taxpayers  forced  a
new  mode  of  finance  into
Front  of  bill  for  twenty  shillings.  Pennsylvania,  March  20,  1771.
Courtesy  of  the  American  Antiquarian  Society.
effect:  the  public  debt  was  paid
off  as  the  money  used  for
common  expenses  lost  value  in
the  hands  of  those  holding  it;;
those  holders  absorbed  the  loss
if  and  when  the  drop  in  value
became  permanent.  Participants
understood  the  dynamic;;
Franklin  called  depreciation  "a
tax  on  money,  a  kind  of
property  very  difficult  to  be
taxed  in  any  other  mode."
Communities  in  turn  debated
its  consequences,  often  taking
political  measures  to  reallocate
the  losses  that  followed
devaluation.  The  high  profile
of  each  monetary  experiment—
pamphleteers  advertised  how
bills  of  credit  operated  in  order
to  establish  their  legitimacy
and  secure  their  acceptance—
emphasized  the  role  of
participants.  The  small  size  of
each  colony  made  the  system  even  more  transparent.
Those  circumstances  changed  the  consciousness  of  participants.
They  became,  first,  increasingly  aware  of  their  provincial
integrity.  The  effort  to  maintain  a  local  money  trained  attention
on  the  boundaries  of  the  community:  the  system  depended  on
the  actions  of  residents,  used  provincial  obligations  as  its
linchpin,  and  created  value  only  within  domestic  borders.  The
Chester  petitioners  thus  identified  the  virtue  of  earlier  paper
money  exactly  in  its  quality  as  "a  medium  of  commerce  issued
to  the  people,  which  from  its  nature  was  not  subject  to  be
transmitted  to  the  mother  country."  Provincial  boundaries  in
turn  underscored  the  politics  within  each  community.
Legislators  became  increasingly  sensitive  to  the  electoral  debate
over  money.  Populist  rhetoric  rose,  heightening  popular
expectations  of  involvement.  The  Chester  experience  again
provides  an  example:  someone  printed  the  petition  to  the
general  assembly  as  a  broadside—and  inspired  colonials  from
Philadelphia  to  the  frontiers  of  the  province  to  submit  similar
pleas,  close  to  sixty  petitions  in  all.  Finally,  pointing  to  the
local  boundaries  and  effects  of  monetary  decisions,  participants
began  to  identify  as  a  priority  the  economic  development  of
themselves  and  their  communities.  The  pro-­paper  propagandists
that  dominated  in  most  of  the  colonies  developed  arguments  for
opening  up  markets  to  the  middling  men  of  their  provinces.  As
the  Chester  petitioners  summed  up  the  operation  of  local  paper,
"from  its  permanency  among  us,  the  merchant,  farmer  and
Back  of  bill  for  twenty  shillings.  Pennsylvania,  March  20,  1771.
Courtesy  of  the  American  Antiquarian  Society.
mechanic  were  always  able  to  obtain  a  proper  currency,  by
which  they  could  conveniently  fulfil  their  engagements."  These
were  not,  however,  proto-­capitalists—their  arguments  stressed
access  to  the  market  for  newcomers  over  security  within  it  for
those  with  material  investments,  unlike  the  arguments  several
decades  later.
Again,  the  practice  of  value
affected  the  very  categories
used  to  constitute  the
community.  "Politics"  ranged
American  actors  against
imperial  ones  on  a  new  issue,
value,  which  had  been  a  central
attribute  of  English
sovereignty.  More  subtly,
within  the  colonies  themselves,
monetary  policy  and  market
access  became  core  matters  of
popular  and  legislative  debate.
That  debate  in  turn  implicated
and  was  itself  influenced  by
basic  legal  categories:  bills  of
credit  were  "contracts"  that
linked  the  public  to  those
holding  its  bills.  As  political
decisions  and  economic
circumstances  changed  the
value  of  money,  participants
molded  the  jurisprudence  of
contract  to  explain,  justify,  or
challenge  those  events  and  the  claims  of  participants.  As  John
Adams  said,  defending  an  episode  of  devaluation  in  1780,  "
[t]he  public  has  its  rights  as  well  as  individuals,  and  every
individual  has  a  share  in  the  rights  of  the  public.  Justice  is  due
to  the  body  politic  as  well  as  to  the  possessor  of  the  bills;;  and  to
have  paid  off  the  bills  at  their  nominal  value  would  have
wronged  the  body  politic."
In  the  paper  approach  to  value,  then,  the  community  organized
its  roles  and  defined  basic  notions  like  "rights"  by  reference  to
a  value  they  expressly  produced  out  of  the  collective
contribution—only  some  called  it  confiscation—of  all
members.  The  approach  reconstituted  the  imperial  design  for
the  colonies  into  a  new  corporal  order.
Capitalism  and  a  New  Coin
Robert  Morris  wrote  his  Report  on  the  Public  Credit  near  the
end  of  a  war  won  largely,  if  painfully,  on  the  power  of  paper
money.  His  report  was  organized  around  that  history;;  it
articulated  the  old  system  and  argued  for  a  new  one.  Here  for
the  first  time,  politics  was  moved  to  the  periphery—Morris  put
it  there  with  a  flourish,  all  to  emphasize  the  space  made  for  the
productivity  of  private  men.  In  the  new  approach,  the  state
would  be  understood  as  a  frame  for  the  creation  of  value  by
individuals.
The  money  at  the  center  would  again  be  metal,  but  Morris
assumed  a  kind  of  currency  far  removed  from  the  Irish  harp.
Apparently  projecting  a  specie  supply  with  a  price  set  stably  by
international  exchange,  he  happily  excluded  politicians  from
controlling  quantities  of  money  in  circulation.  He  then
advocated  adding  a  rather  new  device:  instruments  of  public
debt.  Unlike  taxes,  which  quickly  became  burdensome  to
taxpayers  (and,  because  their  weight  was  "more  sensible,"
invited  protest  too  easily),  government  borrowing  could  raise
revenue  without  any  discernable  impact  on  the  citizenry.  In  the
meantime,  participants  multiplied  their  money  with  the  interest-­
bearing  notes  that  public  borrowing  produced—they  added  to
the  currency,  in  other  words,  again  apparently  without  the
intervention  of  politicians.  Indeed,  state  legislatures  at  the  end
of  the  decade  would  struggle  to  defend  the  very  institution—
control  over  money—that  had  earlier  won  them  so  much
power.
As  for  the  problems  associated  with  debt,  Morris  dismissed
them  with  the  fuel  that  powered  the  whole  system—individual
productivity.  Borrowing  paired  with  that  tonic  drive  had,  in  his
view,  only  one  result—economic  growth.  Farmer  after  farmer
who  borrowed  to  improve  his  land  earned  more  than  enough  to
pay  back  his  loans—Morris  chose  his  hypothetical  deliberately
and,  he  may  have  felt,  quite  diplomatically.  The  same  logic
would  work  in  the  aggregate:  government  would  borrow  and
use  the  money  to  good  effect.  The  economic  growth  that
followed  would  make  paying  off  the  principal  easy  and  make
the  country  wealthy.  In  the  meantime,  the  system  would  tie
public  creditors,  those  most  able  and  entrepreneurial  in
Morris’s  view,  to  the  new  nation.
The  political  economy  that  Morris  anticipated  would  be  as
publicly  structured  as  the  regimes  improvised  by  Elizabeth  or
the  American  provincials.  When  the  Federalists  accepted  many
of  the  tenets  proposed  by  Morris,  they  had  also  to  construct  the
collective  conditions  that  would  make  it  operate.  Politics,  that
is,  did  not  so  much  recede  as  change  its  shape.  A  freely  floating
metallic  money  did  not,  as  it  happened,  produce  sufficiently
stable  prices  without  complex  interventions:  the  negotiations
necessary  to  run  a  bimetallic  system  or  maintain  the  gold
standard  consumed  seemingly  limitless  political  energy  in  the
nineteenth  century.  Legislatures  at  the  same  time  lost  their
power  to  add  to  the  money  supply  if  specie  was  scarce  and
prices  fell—but  until  foreign  money  arrived  seeking  bargains,
representatives  could  borrow  instead.  Public  debt  provided  the
new  means  of  public  finance,  and  private  credit,  generated  by
the  new  national  bank  and  its  state  counterparts,  further
multiplied  available  gold  and  silver.  The  debate  over  economic
policy  continued  with  new  contours.
Likewise,  the  law  developed  for  an  earlier  approach  to  value
was  revised  for  the  new  order;;  Americans  did  not  suddenly
discover  "rights"  that  would  make  the  new  system  work—they
redefined  them  that  way.  Courts  and  legislatures  developed
doctrines  of  negotiability  and  dismantled  other  safeguards,  like
requirements  restricting  transferability,  which  had  traditionally
been  attached  to  legal  contracts.  As  for  the  government’s
obligations  under  public  instruments—bonds  now  rather  than
money—arguments  drawn  from  private  law  furnished  new
models  that  disallowed  devaluations  like  those  that  had
occurred  in  the  colonial  world.  The  courts,  with  their
orientation  towards  individuated  disputes,  became  the  oracles  of
"contract,"  and  legislatures,  formerly  the  brokers  of  complex
revaluations  that  balanced  individual  and  group  claims,
retreated  from  the  responsibilities  to  recalibrate  value  they  had
claimed  in  the  earlier  system.  The  "public,"  once  conceived  as  a
distinctive  entity  with  organic  significance  became  an  aggregate
of  individuals,  a  transformation  that  boosted  the  leveling
rhetoric  of  individualism,  even  as  it  ceded  populist  claims  based
on  shared  economic  circumstances.
If  Morris’s  system  was  as  publicly  structured—indeed,  as
controversially  constructed—as  previous  orders,  what  was  new
was  its  approach  to  value.  Recognizably  capitalist,  that
approach  defined  politics  as  a  framework  for  value  produced  by
private  activity  and  investment.  Citizenship  itself  reflected  the
revision:  investing  in  the  government  for  profit  became  a
public  service,  lauded  and  promoted.  The  boundaries  that
defined  politics  as  a  setting  for  individual  entrepreneurial  action
depended  on  the  courts;;  their  developing  doctrines  drew  new
lines  that  marked  financial  gains  largely  as  private.
Increasingly,  the  market  appeared  independent  of  the  very
materials  that  had  created  it,  reinforcing  a  gathering  assumption
of  its  autonomy.  The  capitalist  approach  to  value,  in  other
words,  itself  conditioned  the  world  in  ways  that  located  the
political  as  legitimate  insofar  as  it  supported  liberal  individual
agency.
A  History  of  Value
The  transformations  told  by  money  matter  enormously.  The
Irish  harp,  the  paper  proposed  by  the  Chester  petitioners,  and
Morris’s  specie-­and-­debt  system  were  very  different  media,
designed  to  produce  value  in  very  different  ways.  Those
approaches  to  value  organized  the  constitutional  systems  in
which  they  occurred.  They  changed  divisions  of  authority,
including  those  between  law  and  politics  and  between  public
and  private.  They  redistributed  material  power,  variously
allowing  monarchs,  taxpayers,  and  public  creditors  to  claim  the
resources  of  others.  They  forced  their  creators  to  invent
concepts  as  distinct  as  a  "public  contract"  and  the  "autonomous
market."  Those  concepts,  claims,  and  divisions  of  authority
mark  our  world  as  surely  as  money.  They  are,  in  fact,  carried
into  practice  with  every  exchange  of  that  medium,  as  the  stories
above  reveal.  Value,  as  much  as  meaning,  has  a  history.
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maintaining  the  gold  standard  are  accessibly  suggested  by  Barry
Eichengreen,  in  Globalizing  Capital:  A  History  of  the
International  Monetary  System  (Princeton,  1996).
  
Discuss  this  and  other  articles  in  the  Common-­place  Coffeeshop
Copyright  ©  2000-­2007  Common-­place  The  Interactive  Journal  of  Early  American  Life,  Inc.,  all
rights  reserved
Why  a  Common  Place?  |  Previous  Issues  |  Editorial  Board  |  Terms  of  Use
